17/01/2024
Since the 8th of October, Lebanon has been on the brink of a full-scale war. Villages on the southern borders have been repeatedly attacked by Israel, causing the displacement of more than 40,000 of their residents. In the past weeks, the conflict area and intensity grew as Israel increasingly attacked civilian targets. Threats of escalation of war have been repeatedly made by Israel. Many countries issued warnings to their nationals to leave the country. The Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) advised Filipinos in Lebanon to consider leaving while the Beirut airport was still functional. The Nepalese honorary consulate also advised citizens who wish to return home to prepare their documents.
Following Israel’s war on Lebanon in 2006, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported that migrant workers “were the forgotten victims of the Lebanese conflict and their plight remained largely ignored and under-reported”. In the immediate aftermath of Beirut Port Explosion in 2020, migrant workers were also deprioritized as rescue and relief efforts were uneven: “Migrant workers who survived the blast describe living through a double trauma: first the shock of the blast, then the brazen indifference as to whether they live or die.”
While the context of 2006 differs largely from that of 2023, especially when it comes to the stakeholders involved and committed to the protection of migrant workers in Lebanon, the reality remains that individuals have already started struggling with challenges specific to their situation given the evolution of the multilayered crisis. In case of escalation, these challenges will likely increase. Looking back at the 2006 war and the 2020 Beirut port explosion also helps us assess the impact of such emergencies on the migrant communities in order to foresee the challenges and potential gaps to prepare accordingly.
This brief aims to share information on the current situation of migrant domestic workers in Lebanon, as in ARM we believe in the importance of collective planning and actions. Information shared in this brief was outlined by community organizers and representatives from 16 different countries, to assess the needs already emerging from the situation of the country, as well as their concerns about their future in case of escalation.
According to IOM’s Migrant presence monitoring (MPM) in Lebanon in August 2023, around 12% of migrant workers in the country reside in the districts already directly impacted by the conflict (Sour 6%, El Nabatieh 5%, Bint Jbeil 1%) the majority of these are live-in workers. Many residents of these areas, as well as others from neighboring districts were internally displaced and spread across the rest of the country (Displacement map on October 20)
The situation of migrants in these areas remains mostly unmonitored.The general assumption is that workers would have fled with their employers but previous experiences have shown disturbing patterns of abandonment of migrant domestic workers by their employers in times of crisis. The closure of businesses and the fleeing of employers also raises questions about live out workers, who may be losing their jobs and sources of income.
Community organizers are attempting to support their compatriots, Ethiopian workers living in Saida and the South are compiling lists of Ethiopian workers residing in the south upon the request of their consulate. However, many Ethiopian workers have their passports confiscated, or could be undocumented, which can complicate their access to services provided by their embassy. Moreover, efforts of individual community organizers have multiple limitations and will not be enough to acquire a complete database, especially in the context of instability and displacement.
Some other communities with smaller populations and responsive consular staff such as the Philippines, Cote d’Ivoire and Togo reported that their consulates representatives checked on them, mostly through whatsapp groups, and ensured the evacuation and repatriation of those interested. However, other community organizers from countries such as Kenya and Cameroon are not already in touch with their compatriots in the south, and reported no efforts on the part of their consulates to find or assist affected migrants.
The internal displacement of the residents of the South have reportedly affected migrants in other areas. Many community organizers reported that live out migrant domestic workers started facing rent increases and eviction threats: this is reportedly due to the landlords’ intention of profiting off the displaced groups’ need for accommodation or in other cases, to shelter family members, personal acquaintances, or Lebanese families from the south in the houses they had already rented to migrant workers.
Other migrant domestic workers have also reported an increased loss of jobs due to employers traveling abroad, supposedly until the situation gets better, or cutting on the costs of domestic work. Some live-in workers are reportedly getting abandoned by their employers, mostly those who had the opportunity to temporarily leave the country due to the situation.
Moreover, community organizers have also reported that their landlords are not allowing them to shelter individuals from their communities. This highlights a potential increase in needs for shelters even for women in areas not directly affected by the conflict.
In 2023, the Lebanese government, supported by the media, continued the crackdown on marginalized groups in the country, notably refugees. Following months of decrees, decisions and policies by the state, the army and the General Security (GS), waves of arrests and forced deportations took place. Municipalities in particular played a big role by issuing and illegally enforcing discriminatory policies, outside of their jurisdiction. Moreover, sporadic violence and organized violence by local armed groups increased, and were tolerated by the authorities, including enforcing illegal checkpoints and raids targeting refugees and migrants in areas including Beirut and Metn.
In fact, ARM received multiple reports of migrant workers being harassed, robbed and threatened to have their motorbikes confiscated at such checkpoints. They were unsure whether these were held by a legitimate authority, the municipality or thugs. This has also caused more economic hardships for undocumented domestic workers, as many of them reported that some workers are sometimes too scared to commute and go to work, and are thus losing their jobs, and their source of income to them and their families.
The challenges listed below are forecasted based on the current situation of migrant workers as well as looking back retrospectively to similar crises in Lebanon. It is important to note that some of them are already being experienced by migrants, both in areas directly affected by the war and/or by the displacement. Escalations, however, mean that these challenges might continue on a higher scale.
Such cases were quite common during the 2006 war. At the time Caritas reportedly collaborated with migrant community leaders to track the workers and intervened with ISF to free them. Following the war, the Sri Lankan embassy reported that several women had arrived with broken limbs and back injuries after trying to escape using sheets from windows or balconies. In the aftermath of the 2020 Beirut port explosion, workers were also left in situations that endanger their life, such as employers fleeing destroyed homes and neighborhoods and leaving injured workers behind.
In this case, reaching these workers might be challenging, for many reasons:
Reports from 2006 highlighted increasing violence against migrant domestic workers during the war. IOM has reported numerous cases of employers threatening migrants in order to prevent them from leaving. Workers also reported being denied basic rights when fleeing with employers including a decent place to sleep and access to food.
Similarly, in 2020 hundreds of employers abandoned live-in domestic workers in the streets or in front of their embassies or consulates, often without their salaries and documentation. Migrant domestic workers are also at an increased risk of GBV, and as with rising tensions, violence by employers due to arguments about wage theft or requests for evacuation are likely to occur, in case of the escalation of the war in other areas of Lebanon, or its prolongation in the South.
Currently, community organizers have already reported on cases of domestic workers abandoned by their employers who left the country to flee the war, which can be expected to increase with further escalations.
In case of war, the need for evacuation for many workers will be urgent and imminent, and evacuations should be insured unconditionally and freely to everyone who wishes to leave.
Evacuations of migrant domestic workers in 2020 presented numerous challenges, witnessed by supporting organizations, including:
Challenges related to evacuation fees and capacity: The number of applications might exceed the processing capacity of embassies and consulates especially for those with big numbers of citizens. Challenges of capacity and delays might also be experienced on the part of GS.
Consular response known to be inefficient or non-existent: As mentioned above, migrant workers from countries that have no diplomatic presence in Lebanon or from countries with unresponsive consulates would face additional obstacles in getting repatriated when needed.
In the 2006 war, even governments with embassies in Lebanon lacked the capacity to help their citizens due to understaffing and underfunding. 2020 proved to be no different, and the evacuation of most workers depended on the support of IOM, and other NGOs, and fundraisers. Many workers who wished to leave were indefinitely trapped in the country. For instance, the Bangladeshi embassy ran a repatriation program in 2020 and supported hundreds of workers to return, however this service was limited to those who could pay for their own tickets, which prevented most workers from accessing this service.
Similarly, hundreds of migrant domestic workers protested in front of their embassies and consulates in Lebanon to object to the lack of responsiveness towards their needs. These protests accused their missions of not taking the measures needed to facilitate their evacuation. Many NGOs also experienced hurdles in collaborating with certain embassies, consulates and honorary consulates on repatriations, including lack of cooperation, any signs of duty of care, delays and difficulty in issuing traveling documents.
In case of military escalation in Lebanon, many workers will choose to stay. It is important to note that some of the countries of origin of migrant workers are also at war أدناه أو راسلونا عبر civil unrest, and thus the nationals of these communities do not have the option to go back home.
Ensuring shelters specific for migrant workers and migrant domestic workers would be a crucial need. Some current planning efforts are not segregating services by nationality to prevent social tensions, however, specific shelters in all areas for migrant workers would be highly needed for multiple reasons.
In 2006, the detention center for migrant workers was still located under the Adlieh bridge, and bridges were regular targets of the Israeli attacks. Accordingly, Caritas reportedly advocated for the release and evacuation of detained migrants in Lebanon at the time. In 2020, and during the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdowns, the Lebanese government stopped the administrative detentions of migrants and refugees. Many migrants remain in administrative detention for prolonged periods. With the increased crackdown, it is expected that such numbers might be increasing. While the need to support in such cases is pertinent at all times, it will become particularly relevant in case of war.
In 2006, some migrant workers in the south could not reach Beirut even if their employer did not prevent them from going. In one case, women who were left and locked in a house in Saida, and managed to escape, reportedly had to pay 400$ for a trip from Saida to Beirut. Migrant workers fleeing danger zones might have challenges specific to them in accessing safe areas for multiple reasons.
In the aftermath of the 2020 Beirut port explosion, multiple stakeholders, including the Lebanese government and local NGOs started relief programs to help individuals affected by the blast. However, ironically enough, several humanitarian assistance groups refused to assist migrant workers. For instance, the Ministry of Health issued a circular to treat the injured for free. Although the governmental decree did not explicitly exclude non-Lebanese, in practice migrant workers were denied access both to food and free treatment. Similarly, the Army refused to supply aid boxes to non-Lebanese residents of the port area. Concern Worldwide reported that around 41.6% of non-Lebanese individuals affected by the blast could not access healthcare, and more than 28% have received no assistance following the blast. Migrant workers and refugees were even excluded from the official death counts of victims.
This raises serious concerns regarding the treatment of migrants and their access to services without programs specifically targeted at them. The governmental emergency plan explicitly relies on UN entities to support migrants in the country, and thus fully relies on them to account for their particularities. This increases the pressure and responsibilities of CSOs to cater their response to be able to accommodate these needs At the moment there is no demographic or legal status breakdown of displacement figures by nationality. This makes it extremely challenging to achieve equitable support efforts without taking into account the high level of racism and xenophobia in the country, backed by hate speech and discriminatory policies. Moreover, the pre-existing status quo means that migrant domestic workers have specific needs that can not be addressed by a generic approach.
The absence of initiatives that primarily and specifically aim to address the relief and support of migrant domestic workers in Lebanon will mostly mean that they will, once again, pay a higher price in case of crisis and suffer severe violations of their rights as humans, migrants and workers.
للاستعلام عن هذا البيان والسياق ، راسلنا عبر البريد الإلكتروني أو املأ النموذج.
نعمل في حركة مناهضة العنصرية بجهد على العديد من النشاطات والمبادرات المختلفة. معظم نشاطنا تعدّ في الإمكان بفضل فريق من المتطوعين/ات يعمل مع فريقنا الأساسي بشغف و إخلاص.
حركة مناهضة العنصرية هي حركة شعبيّة أنشأتها جهات شبابيّة ناشطة في لبنان بالتعاون مع عمّال وعاملات أجانب. نعمل معًا في الحركة على توثيق الممارسات العنصرية والتحقيق فيها وفضحها ومحاربتها من خلال مبادرات وحملات عديدة. تمّ إطلاق حركة مناهضة العنصرية عام 2010 عقب حادثة وقعت في أحد أكثر المنتجعات البحرية الخاصّة المعروفة في بيروت.